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Colloquium: The Deregulation of Industry

Introduction:
The Search for Limits and the Quest for Theory
JOSEPH

F. BRODLEY*

Uneasiness with the regulation of industry is not new. At varying
times from the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 onward
the wisdom of particular regulatory schemes has been challenged. The
cry for radical regulatory reform is thus not voiced for the first time.
What is new about the present movement for regulatory change is the
broadness of its critique and its willingness to generalize the deficiencies
of regulation across industry lines.
The causes of the current loss of public confidence in regulation are
several, and no doubt include a diminishing level of confidence in governmental institutions in the post-Watergate era. But there have also
been developments within the regulatory field which have influenced the
present skepticism. To begin with, a growing number of industry case
studies have reached highly critical conclusions about the results of
regulation in particular industries,1 and their impact was not softened
by the spectacular failure of the nation's largest railroad in the industry
longest regulated.
At the same time the theoretical justification for regulation was
also being undermined, or at least challenged. The received justification
had been that regulation had arisen in order to promote the public interest where market imperfections, such as natural monopoly and large
externalities, precluded the normal reliance on a competitive market to
achieve socially beneficial results. This public interest theory was challenged by a radically different, almost sinister, theory of capture or cartel
exploitation.' According to this theory, regulation, far from being imposed by resolute public officials on presumably reluctant firms, was actively induced by industry as a cover and a vehicle for cartelization.
Alternatively, it was suggested that regulation was in reality a somewhat disguised method of redistributing income, or a form of taxation,
* Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
1See W.A. JORDAN, AiamNE REGuLATIoN IN AmCA: EFFECTS AND IMTERFECMONS
(1970); PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED IViARKETS passim (A. Phillips ed. 1975);

MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 167 (1971).
2 See P. MAcAvoY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION (1965); Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulations, 2 BELL J. ECoN. & MAN. Sci. 3 (1971).
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by which some users of a regulated service subsidized other users.3 But
the legitimacy of such redistribution was not easy to defend, for those
who paid the subsidy-the trunk line users-were not necessarily richer
than those who received it-the peripheral users.
Growing dissatisfaction with regulation has led to various proposals
for deregulation, and several bills have been introduced into the Congress. But these proposals have made notably little progress, and the
achievement of any siguificant deregulation is at this writing highly
problematic.
Is part of the barrier obstructing the movement toward any significant deregulation due to the absence of effective criteria for determining when and to what extent deregulation should be pursued? Indeed, can we be so bold as to ask whether a general theory of regulation
is possible? After all, whatever the reason for its original enactment,
regulation once in place changes the environment in which an industry
operates and firms make decisions. But does it then follow that each
regulated environment is sui generis, or can some generalizations be
made across regulatory boundaries that will be useful in determining
how far deregulation should be carried and what theory should light
its way?
To address themselves to these and similar questions a mixed group
of economists and legal scholars were invited to prepare principal papers
and comments, to be delivered at the annual meeting of the Association
of American Law Schools on December 27, 1975. This colloquium is
the fruit of that effort.
In the first paper Professor Liebeler urges that the theory of deregulation be based on the concept of the zero-based budget. Under such
an approach each regulatory scheme, and every part of it, would have
to justify itself on the assumption that the slate was wiped clean and
the regulation was under consideration for adoption. The only justification for moving beyond tie point of zero-regulation (or in this context,
for not deregulating) would be a demonstrated market failure. Market
failure is defined narrowly in terms of unavoidable externality effects,
i.e., industry behavior that cannot be internalized into firm decisionmaking at acceptable transaction costs. Even then, regulation would be
permitted only to the extent necessary to correct the specific market
failure and restore the possibility of market transactions. Applying this
approach to drug regulation, where the market failure (if any) is a lack
of adequate information on the long term efficacy of new drugs, the ap$ See Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J.EcoN. & MAw. ScI. 22 (1971).
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propriate regulatory correction turns out to be simply the providing of
sufficient information to the public to permit individual consumer choice.
Finally, any special problems of deregulation caused by the presence of
an existing regulatory system, such as interference with vested property rights or inequitable income redistribution, should either be ignored
as unavoidable frictions or compensated by direct subsidy.
Professor Noll finds the course of regulation beset with institutional
problems, including bias and delay, an excessive clinging to the status
quo, a decisional system frequently requiring administrative choice to be
made on insufficient data, and a philosopher-king complex compelling
the appearance of administrative infallibility. Like Professor Liebeler,
he prefers a decentralized market decision where possible.. He recognizes, however, that complete deregulation is not feasible where essential
features of a decentralized market are lacking, including (1) numerous
participants, (2) cheap and reliable information, and (3) property rights.
Accepting the need for regulation under these conditions, he calls for
the use of greater imagination in devising (or revising) the regulatory
tools. More specifically, he would first ask whether there is a specific
market failure that can be identified and bridged (here his approach is
similar to Professor Liebeler's). But second he recognizes that some
market failures cannot be bridged and that in those instances centralized
regulation will remain necessary (e.g., hazardous complex machines).
However, bearing in mind the institutional weaknesses in the regulatory
process, improved results can be obtained by sharply separating the factfinding and evaluation process of regulation from the ultimate decisionmaking responsibility. While the former would remain in the hands of
the administrative agency, the latter should be recognized for what it
is-a political decision-and placed in the hands of an institution more
capable of making that kind of choice, namely the Congress.
For Professor Wilson a scientifically rigorous theory of deregula'tion is as incapable of present realization as is a general theory of
regulation; both would require inclusion of an unmeasurable variablepolitical power. The more useful question to which we should address
ourselves is under what conditions deregulation is most likely to be successful. Such an approach enables the formulation of specific guidelines
for deregulation, which Professor Wilson enumerates: (1) identification and quantification of the costs of existing regulation, (2) assessment of the benefits of such regulation, (3) ascertainment whether the
benefits are attainable by less costly means, and (4) implementation of
deregulation gradually in a step by step extension of the bounds of discretionary behavior. Applying these guidelines to his own area of spe-
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cialty, the Interstate Commerce Commission, Professor Wilson finds the
costs of regulation to be high in lost efficiencies and the benefits to be
largely in the form of transfer payments by which one class of customer
subsidizes another. He determines that if these benefits are desired, they
can be better achieved by direct subsidy payments: Nevertheless, deregulation would impose adjustment costs and forfeit or diminish some
existing property rights. Thus, the gradual approach to deregulation
incorporated in several congressional proposals, allowing rate changes
within a defined range and easing entry and exit restrictions, commends
itself. The basic thrust of deregulation policy in transport (and perhaps
elsewhere) would be to give much greater weight to considerations of
efficiency and technology advance, and to meet other social goals by
direct policies.
Professor Schwartz also rejects the need for a theory of deregulation, but for different reasons. Acknowledging that there are serious
problems with current regulation, he argues that the failure is not one
of theory, but rather of the performance of the regulators. Focusing
ori the field of electric power regulation, he finds that rate regulation has
been defecive because it has been administered essentially on a cost-plus
basis, insulating the regulated firms from risk and providing inadequate incentive for optimal behavior. In addition, the regulatory agency
(FPC) has consistently failed to promote competition, both by failing
to permit its introduction where feasible and by directly approving anticompetitive arrangements. The proper course of regulatory reform then
is to correct these institutional failures, and this can be done by taking
two tfirhary steps. First, the existing cost-plus method of price regulation should be replaced and management performance indicators should
be adopted by which the efficiency of firm behavior could be assessed;
this would then permit administrative recognition of both superior and
deficient performance. Second, the regulatory agencies should cease and
desist from any toleration or encouragement of non-competitive conduct,
and instead should promote competition wherever possible, and much
more fully than they have done as a positive force to improve performance, enhance efficiency, and spark technological advance.

